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Abstract
This thesis seeks to investigate the similarities and differences in the
characterization of Amazigh identity between nineteenth century British writings and
contemporary (early twenty-first century) Moroccan news articles. The methods
employed to do so included broad reading of both British and Moroccan writings, and
analysis and sorting of the characterizations found therein. The results of this process
showed that the British perspective, while nuanced, focused excessively on the Amazigh
as violent and less civilized; contemporary Moroccan news sources portrayed the
Amazigh as peaceful, organized, and seeking equal rights within Morocco. Conclusions
of this study are thus: the British perspective, while not entirely inaccurate, was mediated
by Orientalist thought; several fundamental aspects of Amazigh culture changed in the
intervening period between the two groups of sources.
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Introduction
I studied abroad in Rabat, Morocco during the spring semester of 2013. One of
the first things I remember learning upon my arrival in country: There is a hanūt on every
corner in Morocco’s major cities. These little shops are very much like scaled down
versions of American convenience stores, where one can go to buy fruit, bread, candy,
toiletries, or cell phone minutes. The second thing I learned about them: Hanūts are
owned by Berbers. This turned out to be true for the hanūt that lay down the block from
our study center. I developed a certain rapport with Muhammed, one of the employees—
every time I came in, he would teach me how to ask for what I wanted in Tamazight. I
found this both exciting and surprising, because in this land of polyglots, the
demographics favor Arabic and French speakers in urban areas, and Arabic and Berber
speakers in more rural settings. This hanūt employee’s pride in his mother tongue
intrigued me and inspired me to learn more about this ancient ethnic group.
Morocco considers itself an Arab country with its other North African neighbors;
it is a member of the Arab League and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, which leads one
to believe that its population is largely made up of Arabs. This, however, is not the case.
In fact, there is not even a clear, objective dividing line between Arab and Berber ethnic
groups. Most demographic surveys, such as those by CIA World Factbook and the
Encyclopedia of Nations, list Morocco as 99% “Arab-Berber,” and it is thus up to
individuals to self-identify. In my understanding, which was informed by my professors
in-country, the majority of city-dwelling Moroccans identify as Arab (many Moroccans
with acknowledged Berber heritage identify as Arab, and have little or no command of
!1

Tamazight), while most Berber-identifying Moroccans live in small, rural towns and
villages, with a minority living in Morocco’s larger cities.
Because of this trend, the Berber population of Morocco has historically been
decidedly less visible than the Arab population, both socially and politically. In recent
years, that trend has been working in the reverse. When King Mohammed VI ascended to
the throne in 1999, he instituted a series of liberalizing reforms in the nation’s economic,
political, and social realms. These reforms have sparked more vocal calls from Morocco’s
Berber population for equality, as well as giving Berber activists more and better
channels through which to express these calls. This increase in visibility raises questions
about why this equality-seeking activism is necessary, where the notion of Berbers as
second-class citizens comes from, and whether this notion could be the result of
European imperialism.
There are areas of the world that remain fraught with problems related to the
lingering effects of European colonization and other international meddling. Many of the
issues in Iraq and Syria today can be traced back to the arbitrary delineation of national
boundaries by outside powers; contemporary issues of race and class in Brazil stem from
Portuguese imperialism; South Africa has only recently recovered from the strife caused
by apartheid, which was based on racial segregation first implemented by Dutch and
British colonialism. It is therefore plausible that the lingering disparity in the treatment of
Arab Moroccans versus Amazigh Moroccans also stems from, or was exacerbated by,
European influence. Ethnic tensions were likely already present when Europeans first
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gained prominence in Morocco, but there is significant historical precedent to support the
speculation that the Europeans further intensified these feelings.
In this thesis, I aim to compare two different perspectives of Moroccan
Imazighen: that of British writers who traveled to Morocco in the nineteenth century, and
that of contemporary Moroccan news media. To that end, the research question I will
address is “How do the characterizations of Imazighen by nineteenth-century British
authors compare to the characterizations of Imazighen by contemporary Moroccan
media?” The British were the first Europeans to gain access to Morocco, which made
possible France’s later colonization of the country. They were also pioneers in the
practice of foreign influence, both direct and indirect. As such, their writings about those
endeavors and experiences would have been representative of other European countries
seeking to replicate or improve upon the British method.
The methodology I employ for this project is text-based analysis. I have gathered
source material from British authors during the middle to late nineteenth century, and
contemporary Moroccan news outlets. The British sources are of both an academic and
popular nature, in order to give the most comprehensive understanding of British
characterizations of Moroccan Berbers at the time. The contemporary news articles come
from internet sources based in Morocco regarding recent activities of Berber activists.
These articles shed light on the characterization of Berbers within their own country in
commonly available sources. The analysis consists of comparisons and contrasts between
the two groups of sources to see what characterizations are apparent in both, and which
appear in one, but not the other.
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The thesis is laid out in four chapters. First is the historical context of Morocco,
first focusing on the country’s history from the Berber perspective, and second moving on
to Great Britain’s involvement within Morocco. The second chapter introduces the texts
from the nineteenth century to be analyzed in the third chapter, in two groups: those of an
academic nature and those of a popular nature. It goes on to give a brief overview of the
most prevalent trends within each group of sources. Chapter three delves into the analysis
of the texts themselves. Organized by subheadings based on common characterizations
from the sources, this chapter synthesizes observations made by the various British
authors to create a cohesive image of the Berber from their writings. Chapter four applies
the same methodology for the contemporary news sources from Morocco, but because of
the brevity of these sources, their introduction and analysis is combined into a single
chapter.
These analyses yielded some unexpected conclusions. Rather than a simplistic
characterization of Moroccan Berbers, nineteenth-century British authors produced a
nuanced and complex understanding. Their characterizations were expectedly mostly
negative and rooted in ethnocentrism, but they displayed a depth of study and inspection
that I did not expect. Instead of focusing on physical appearance, location, or one
prominent aspect of Berber culture and society, British writers made note of several
different cultural facets, such as the differences between the various Berber groups within
Morocco and their unusual Islamic practices.
The contemporary sources revealed less surprising conclusions. With the
increased visibility of the Berber population since the implementation of Mohammed
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VI’s reforms, the Moroccan news outlets were predictably sympathetic to the Berber
cause. These articles portrayed Berbers as peacefully and legally pursuing equal rights,
and doing so as a unified front, rather than the fragmented villages and tribes observed by
the British writers. Admittedly, there is a century of time difference between the two
groups of texts, over the course of which characteristics of any society can, and
invariably do, change. However, the fact remains that the earlier sources project a
negative view of Berber society, while the more recent exhibit a positive one.
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Chapter 1: Historical Context
Introduction
Because of its location at the crossroads of three separate world regions, the
Kingdom of Morocco has always been a place of international interest. It is a meeting
place for people from Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Europe. Its aboriginal
population, therefore, has been subjected throughout the centuries to various waves of
immigration and colonization. Dynasties from Phoenicia, Rome, and Arabia have all
exercised authority over the lands of modern Morocco before its Amazigh inhabitants
succeeded in initiating several centuries of self-rule. But in the 1700s a new influx of
foreigners who originated in Europe began entering the kingdom. First they came only at
the whim of the Moroccan sultan, but by the middle of the nineteenth century, European
influence and power were firmly entrenched within the Moroccan government. Though
today Morocco is more likely known as a former French colony, the British truly paved
the way for the French to enter in the early twentieth century. It was the British who
forced open the formerly closed Moroccan ports starting in the 1820s, first to themselves,
then to the rest of Europe.
This chapter will first provide an historical overview of the Amazigh position in
Moroccan society and the various foreign influences upon it, in order to provide the
reader with sufficient background knowledge of this target population. This discussion
will begin with the Roman conquest in the third century BCE and carry through to the
reign of the current king of Morocco, Mohammed VI. It will additionally chronicle the
waxing and waning of British influence in Morocco in the nineteenth century in order to
!6

display that the British did in fact have a sufficient extent of influence there to merit the
analysis of British writings from that period.

Amazigh History in Morocco
The Imazighen are the oldest-known inhabitants of North Africa. Archaeological
remains dating as far back as 7000 BC show that Tamazight-speaking peoples originally
inhabited the region ranging from western Egypt all the way to the Atlantic coast of
northwest Africa.1 The term “Amazigh” applies to many different groups, encompassing
tribal groups ranging from the Tuaregs of the Sahara to the Kabyles of northern Algeria to
the three main Amazigh groups that can be found in Morocco today: the Riffians of the
north, the Tamazight of the Middle Atlas mountains, and the Tashethit of the High Atlas
mountains, Anti-Atlas mountains, and Sous region.2 These groups, though also
distinguished by geography, are primarily differentiated by their languages: all speak
what they consider to be separate languages belonging to the same branch of the AfroAsiatic language family. Since the geographic range of Imazighen was so vast throughout
much of the region’s history, and the administration of North Africa by non-African rulers
did not align with the contemporary borders of Morocco, the terms Amazigh and
Imazighen cannot be used to denote populations specifically within Morocco until the
rise of the Idrisid dynasty (788 AD), the first empire with borders approximately aligning
with those of modern Morocco.

1

Robert Montagne, The Berbers: Their Social and Political Organisation, pg 2

2

Vincent Monteil, Morocco, pg 11
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The common term “Berber” is not actually the word that native North Africans
use to refer to themselves. This word originated in Greece to refer to anyone who did not
speak Greek, and was assimilated into the Arabic language as al-barbar. In the Tamazight
language, speakers use the term Amazigh (plural: Imazighen), which means “free person.”
I will therefore be using those terms throughout the duration of this project to refer to
what might otherwise be called the Berber population. Though the word “Berber” has lost
for the most part its negative connotations, the prevalence of its usage over that of the
indigenous term is representative of the lack of political and historical voice that has
plagued the Imazighen since the time of the Roman Empire’s entrance into North Africa
in 146 BCE.3
It seems to slip through unnoticed in the historiography of ancient Rome, but the
Romans did indeed reach and conquer the northwest tip of Africa. There is evidence that
the Romans brought with them to the region their Latin script when they first expanded
their control west from Carthage in 46 B.C.4 Christianity made its way to the region by
way of the Roman empire as well, its spread beginning in the third century and
blossoming after Constantine’s Edict of Milan in the year 312.5 This new system of
writing and new religion caught on in varying degrees throughout the land, but remained
concentrated mainly in and around Roman population centers like Volubilis.6 The

3

id., pg 31

4

Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, pg 31

5

id., pg 40

6

id., pg 33
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Imazighen were able to cast off Roman dominance, with the help of the Vandal invasion
of Africa in 429 AD,7 and afterward, enjoyed about a century of self-rule before the
return of the Romans/Byzantines in a much diminished capacity in 530 AD.8 During this
time of independence, many Imazighen returned to their indigenous pagan religious
practices, and others to Judaism, which had reached Morocco from the east.
When the Arabs came from the east during the last third of the seventh century
AD, they brought a new language, Arabic, and a new religion, Islam, to North Africa. The
Arab conquest of the region was solely military in nature at its outset, but it developed
into a nominal religious conquest as well after the Arabs established their control.
Amazigh chieftains were able to preserve their status in exchange for professed
conversion to Islam, but with no indoctrinating institution like the Christian church, the
Amazigh population at large was slow to convert to Islam in any meaningful sense.9
Similar to the Roman occupation of North Africa, the Arab conquest brought with
it a socio-cultural shift in the cities, where there was significant contact with the Arabs.
Though the majority of the Amazigh population dwelled outside major urban centers,
elements of this shift reached them, as well, albeit at a slower rate and different practice.
Islam replaced the Christianity of the Romans as the religion of civilization, although
Latin-speaking remnants of the Roman occupation qualified, because of their professed
Christianity and Islam’s consideration of Christianity as “ahl al-kitāb,” or “People of the
7

Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, The Berbers, pg 76

8

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States, pg
15
9

Abun-Nasr, pg 71
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Book,” to continue their practices in exchange for a poll-tax.10 Outside of the cities, Islam
was openly combated in many locales, and where it was accepted, it was rarely practiced
in the same style as the Arabs. Converts frequently either adapted its orthodoxy to suit
their pre-existing lifestyles or became extremely strict and puritanical in their practice.11
The Arabs forced conversion upon non-ahl al-kitāb Imazighen, in line with the
philosophy behind their conquest to spread Islam, and the new religion became wellspread by the end of the eighth century. But this conversion, while nominally granting
converts access to the Islamic ummah (the community of believers), did not bring the
Imazighen into social parity with the Arabs. The Imazighen were enslaved and
conscripted into the Arab army to continue the conquest into Spain and across the
Pyrenees.12 However, this entrance into the Islamic community did bring about nominal
recognition of the Imazighen as a distinct people-group— the Arabs adopted the Latin
term barbarus as “al-barbar” and made it a proper noun, thus unofficially
acknowledging the Imazighen as a distinct nation, a people.13
The Arabic language, too, was not quickly adopted by the Imazighen, initially
being spoken only in the cities and the areas immediately surrounding them as the
language of government and learning.14 While Islam reached and rooted itself firmly as

10

Brett and Fentress, pg 83

11

Montagne, pg 9

12

Brett and Fentress, pg 82-83

13

id., 83

14 Abdelaziz

Touri, “A Brief History of Morocco," pg 20
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the religion of a majority of the population of North Africa,15 Arabic was much slower to
establish itself. However, the Amazigh languages, which had weathered the storm of
Punic and Latin civilizations, eventually gave way to “the language of God.” The reasons
for this were pragmatic: the laws of sharia, the Islamic system of religious law that
governs daily life, were written in Arabic16; Arabic had become the language of trade17;
and Islamic prayers and sermons were, and indeed still are, conducted in Arabic. But
even though Arabic was the language of their new religion, in many Amazigh
communities, Tamazight was retained for household and other non-religious contexts.
The Imazighen revolted against the Arabs in the name of Kharijism in 740.18
According to this doctrine, only the best and most devout of Muslims was worthy to lead
the ummah.19 The revolt all but unseated the control of the Arabs in North Africa.
However, upon the defeat of the Arabs, too many Amazigh would-be rulers sprang up,
leading to an almost constant state of war that lasted for thirty years.20 In the end, Idris
Ibn Abdullah, a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima
and a refugee from the east, was able to establish himself as the ruler of the land.21 He

15

Brett and Fentress, pg 124

16

id., 125

17

Ibid

18

Maddy-Weitzman, pg 24

19

Brett and Fentress, pg 88

20

Ibid

21

id., pg 89
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settled in his new capital at Fes in 788 AD22. As previously stated, this was the first
political entity with a geographic shape roughly the same as modern Morocco. During the
reign of the Idrisids, there remained a level of antagonism between the Arab and Amazigh
inhabitants, even though they shared a religion.23 Though they were occupied by both the
Fatimids from Tunisia and the Umayyads of Andalusia, the Idrisids remained the nominal
rulers of this region until the rise of the Almoravids in the middle of the eleventh
century.24
The Almoravids (those “bound together”) were an Amazigh dynasty that came
north out of the Sahara to conquer all of Morocco and Andalusia, starting in the 1050s.25
They were united by the Amazigh theologian Abdallah Ibn Yasin and military chief
Yahya Ibn Ibrahim, and established their capital at Marrakesh in 1070.26 Ibn Yasin’s goal
was to unify the land under one brand of Islam, the Maliki school, and to eliminate any
remaining paganism, Christianity, or non-Maliki Islam.27 Though Ibn Yasin died in battle
in 1059,28 the community he brought together survived his death and established a
dynasty that would rule the Islamic West for nearly a century. This dynasty represented

22

Touri, pg 20

23

Brett and Fentress, pg 90

24

Touri, pg 20

25

Bret and Fentress, pg 99

26

id., pg 99-100

27

id., pg 101

28

id., pg 102
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the fulfillment of Kharijite doctrine, which espoused that the right to rule fell to him who
was most godly, regardless of origin.29 It also represented a geographical and ethnic
reversal of the previous campaigns of the region, with the Imazighen of the south moving
north and conquering the Arabs, as well as other Amazigh groups.30
Though they were Imazighen, the Almoravid rulers were enamored with Arabic
literature. “They were patrons of poets and certain of their governors enjoyed erotic verse
and took delight in the art of the troubadours.”31 However, this enthusiasm for Arabic
literary culture did not equate to good relations with the Arabs. The Arabs of Andalusia
“detested this domination (by the Amazigh Almoravids). Their oppression weighed
heavily upon them, and their hearts were full of hate and indignation against the new
rulers.”32 The Almoravids differed from the Arabs in one superficial, but nonetheless key
way: the men wore veils over their faces that covered all but their eyes33 for protection
from the desert sand. This physically distinguished the Almoravid Imazighen from their
Arab subjects, which led to and reinforced social and cultural distinctions as well.
In 1147, another Amazigh dynasty arose from the High Atlas in the same manner
as the Almoravids: a charismatic religious leader united a group of previously stateless

29

id. pg 107

30

Ibid

31

H. T. Norris, The Berbers in Arabic Literature, pg 138

32

Ibn Khaldun in Ronald Messier, The Almoravids and the Meanings of Jihad, pg xix

33

Messier, pg xix
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Imazighen and led them on a military expedition to “fight in God’s name.”34 This dynasty
was known as the Almohad dynasty, the dynasty that professed the unity of God, and
once they took it from the Almoravids in 1147, they also used Marrakesh as their
capital.35 The biggest difference between the two dynasties was in their approach to
religious governance. While the Almoravids had prescribed to the Maliki school of Islam,
the Almohads prized their own Islamic theology, which was originally scribed in
Tamazight and then translated to Arabic.36 These two dynasties were renowned for their
architecture, and they are responsible for some of the most recognizable structures still
visible in Morocco today, including the Kutubiyya Mosque in Marrakech, the Hassan
Tower and Qasba Oudaya in Rabat, and the Qarawiyyin Mosque in Fez.37 The end of
Almohad supremacy began in Spain in 1212,38 and the dynasty slowly lost control of
various pieces of its empire until the Marinids, yet another group of Imazighen, came
from eastern Morocco and captured Marrakesh in 1269.39
The Marinids, who ruled from 1269 until 1472, invested most of their rule in
competition with the two other Amazigh dynasties born out of the Almohads at Tunis and
Tlemcen, as well as the Christians in Spain, in attempts to recreate the state controlled by

34

Bret and Fentress, pg 108

35

Touri, pg 21

36

Brett and Fentress, pg 109

37

id., pg 111

38

id., pg 113

39

Touri, pg 21
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the Almoravids and Almohads.40 It was during this time that two of the world’s most
famous Imazighen did their work: Ibn Khaldun compiled his famous Kitāb al-ʻIbar and
Ibn Battuta undertook his great travels.41 The Wattasids succeeded the Marinids,42 but
during this time the Sa’adis, the distant relatives of the Idrisids, who had remained in
Morocco since the fall of that dynasty, were steadily on the rise to notoriety. The
Wattasids did not last long before they succumbed to the rise of the Sharifian (descending
from the Prophet) Sa’adis.
The Sa’adis rose to power in 1510 and moved Morocco’s capital back to
Marrakesh.43 Their successful repulsion of the “infidel” Portuguese was a major factor in
their rise to sovereignty over the Wattasids.44 This dynasty, unlike the Amazigh dynasties
before it, relied on a professional army and modern weaponry, rather than tribal
confederations and a specific religious doctrine.45 In the absence of a ruling Amazigh
dynasty, the concept of the marabout came to great importance in Amazigh communities.
A marabout was essentially a Muslim saint, who resided in a zawiya, or monastery. After
the fall of the Marinids and the Wattasids, inhabitants of Amazigh villages began to look
locally for spiritual and political direction. As a result, zawiyas became centers of local

40

Brett and Fentress, pg 115

41

Touri, pg 22

42

Brett and Fentress, pg 170

43

Touri, pg 22

44 Abun-Nasr,
45

pg 207

Brett and Fentress, pg 172
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wealth and power for Moroccan Imazighen,46 rather than the nominal ruling Sa’adi
dynasty. This political and religious schism resulted in, and was aided by, the tendency of
the Imazighen to reside outside of major cities in locations remote to the dynasty. Thus, a
schism once again developed between town-dwelling Arab and tribal Amazigh, and the
dynasty, which had failed to create sustainable institutions of governance, did not long
outlast the death of Ahmad al-Mansur al-Dhahabi, its greatest ruler, in 1603.47
After several decades of disorder and conflict between the Sharifians and
mountain Amazigh marabouts vying for authority, a different Sharifian dynasty arose in
the 1660s, once more out of the dry and desolate south east.48 This dynasty, known as the
Alawite dynasty, was the dynasty with which Britain and other nations would negotiate
throughout the nineteenth century, and is in fact still the ruling family in Morocco today.
Like the Sa’adi dynasty that preceded it, the Alawites did not focus on specific
religious doctrine to legitimize their rule, and therefore a rift remained between the
Alawites and the various Amazigh communities of Morocco. Though they nominally
acknowledged “the Emperor,” Morocco’s Imazighen opposed his Makhzan,49 the
Moroccan name for its government, and were not pliable to his rule or policies. A
uniquely Moroccan concept of bilad al-makhzan (government lands) and bilad al-sība

46

id., pg 170

47

id., pg 172-173

48

Touri, pg 23

49

Brett and Fentress, pg 176
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(lands of no authority) soon developed50— Morocco was a kingdom only partially ruled
by its Sultan. Amazigh communities living in remote and defensible locations existed
outside any true control of the Moroccan government. Some groups around Fez and
Meknes in the Middle Atlas were accessible enough to the Makhzan that their chiefs
played roles in the Alawite government,51 but in most cases, the Amazigh communities in
and around Morocco’s mountains were only subjected to an extremely limited scope of
royal influence. Instead, they mostly lived in isolation by their own customary laws. It is
thus that the romanticized notion of the Amazigh mountaineer, which I will discuss in
chapter 3, finds its roots.
This uneasy status quo remained until European influence reached its zenith at the
opening of the twentieth century. Rather than continuing a precarious and unspecified
peace with the largely autonomous Amazigh communities throughout Morocco, French
and Spanish forces sought to, and ultimately succeeded in, bring these communities under
their own administrations. The Imazighen resisted much longer than the Makhzan— the
Aït ‘Atta of the Anti-Atlas held out until 1934, 22 years after the nominal colonization of
Morocco52— but they, too, were finally subdued by the European occupiers. However,
this subjugation did not necessarily lead to a program of Europeanization. Some
Imazighen did take advantage of new opportunities in the new markets available to

50 Abun-Nasr,

pg 231

51

Brett and Fentress, pg 177

52

Ibid
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them,53 but in general, they were devalued and granted neither work nor political voice in
the new regime.54
The French policy on Imazighen actually served to unite Morocco’s formerly
disparate groups. Their view on the Imazighen was as “a subject race to be kept apart
from their Arab neighbours in the interest of French hegemony.”55 Though many
Moroccan Imazighen were recruited with positive results to the French army,56 the
French issued the Dahir Berbère in 1930, a decree mandating the reinstatement of
customary Amazigh law rather than Islamic law in Amazigh communities.57 This decree,
which many Moroccans interpreted as a tactic of divide and rule, served as a catalyst to
spark a sense of “Moroccan solidarity against the dominion of the infidel” that would
result in Moroccan independence twenty-six years later.58 In conjunction with that, the
growth of communication technology and urban immigration precipitated by the French
both served to remove former barriers between groups and minimize the importance of
one’s ethnic identity.59 Ignorance and fear gave way to understanding and solidarity as the
metaphorical veil was torn from the face of the mysterious “other” through a growth in

53

id., pg 186

54

id., pg 182

55

id., pg 190

56

id., pg 190-191

57

Harold D. Nelson, Morocco, A Country Study, pg 55

58

Brett and Fentress, pg 191

59

Ibid
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accessibility and daily interactions. The Amazigh contingent played a critical role in the
achievement of Moroccan independence in 1956.
Since independence, the situation of Imazighen in Moroccan society has
fluctuated significantly. The reassertion of Moroccan identity after the era of the
protectorate took the shape of Arabization in many sectors, including government,
education, and business.60 This was at the expense of Amazigh culture and identity,
perhaps because the years following independence were the first since the Wattasid
dynasty that Morocco’s government extended to include its Imazighen inhabitants de
facto rather than just de jure. This Arabization compelled urban-dwelling Amazigh
Moroccans to develop Arabic language skills and further separated them from their
Amazigh identities. Five years after achieving independence, Sultan Mohammed V died,
and his son Hassan II came to power. Hassan II’s reign was characterized by many human
rights violations and repression of any and all dissent. Thus, any fledgling Amazigh
identity movement would likely have been silenced quickly. But, perhaps more
influential in this political dormancy was the effect of the French “closed educational
network.”61 This system of schooling, enacted specifically for rural Amazigh
communities, sought to produce local leaders with only a primary or secondary
education,62 who were thus incapable of any organized opposition or political salience
outside their isolated communities.
60

Nelson, pg 120

61

Mark A. Tessler, “Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical Dominance,” Political Elites in Arab
North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, pg 44
62

Ibid
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When Mohammed VI ascended to the throne in 1999, he initiated a series of
liberal reforms in many sectors, notably in the area of Amazigh rights. He established the
Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in 2001, and in 2003 issued a reform introducing
Tamazight-language instruction in primary schools,63 where it had formerly been illegal.
Most recently, Morocco established a new constitution in 2011 claiming a new second
national language— Tamazight. There is now a national news channel broadcasting in
Tamazight to go along with channels in French and Arabic. These social and educational
liberalization policies have been accompanied by a resurgence in Amazigh ethnic pride
that continues to grow, its proponents emphasizing the Amazigh population’s aboriginal
origins in North Africa and reaching out in solidarity to Amazigh communities across
national borders.

British Activity in Morocco
European colonialism moved its focus to Africa and East Asia after Spain and
Portugal conquered most of South and Central America. Europeans realized that these
continents were full of natural resources, as well as people, whom they could exploit for
financial gain. Areas of interest for Britain in the 1800s include Egypt and the Sudan,
southern Africa, Nigeria, and Morocco.
While Morocco was not the biggest international interest for Britain, Britain was
assuredly one of the most influential foreign powers in Morocco from the late 1820s until
the beginning of the twentieth century. Its influence in Morocco was both economic and
political. The opening of Moroccan markets provided the British Empire with a new
63

http://www.minorityrights.org/4886/morocco/berber.html
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market for its own exports, as well as a new market of exotic imports; additionally, the
construction of the Suez Canal in the middle of the century lent Morocco yet more
economic importance in the British agenda. Politically, Britain’s interest in Morocco was
an extension of her rivalry with France. British control in Morocco served as a way for
her to counteract any French moves in North Africa. The extent of Britain’s influence and
interest in Morocco can be seen in the reaction of the British government to Moulay
Abdul Rahman’s decision to revive the practice of Barbary piracy in 1828 in order to help
finance his financially struggling government. The British immediately sent a flotilla to
blockade Tangier until the Sultan reversed his policy.64
Morocco’s European relations began favoring the British during the Napoleonic
Wars at the end of the 1700s and beginning of the 1800s. Moulay Sulayman (1792-1822)
agreed to provide cattle to Gibraltar, provided the British army with grain,65 and opened
up ports for trade, not out of a love of commerce, but because his government was
bankrupt.66 Moulay Abdul Rahman (1822-1859), who had formerly been the governor of
Essaouira and was therefore acutely aware of the benefits of maritime trade, continued to
encourage European trade, signing deals with the British, French, and Portuguese in the
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mid-1820s.67 Trade with Europe continued to grow throughout the course of the century,
and proved to be the Trojan horse of European conquest and colonization.68
France officially made its entrance into the North African world in 1830 with its
invasion and occupation of Algiers. This development made Britain extremely wary, as
Algeria lies on the border of Morocco, and in the estimation of the British government, it
was better that a weak and fractured, and therefore manipulable, state hold control of the
southern half of the mouth of the Mediterranean, rather than a primary European
adversary.69 The Makhzan found itself torn between the designs of the British and the
plans of the powerful notable families in its bigger cities. The British favored a policy of
non-interference in the Franco-Algerian conflict, not wishing to give the French any
reason to change the status quo in Morocco. Many Moroccan notables, however, had
commercial interests in western Algeria which they wished to protect, and therefore
began raising calls to support and protect Dār al-Islām, the Home of Islam.
Sultan Abdul Rahman compromised by dispatching his cousin and brother-in-law
Moulay Ali bin Sulayman to occupy Tlemcen, the nearest Algerian city to the Moroccan
border, in October 1830.70 The arrival of a French warship in Tangier in January 1832
was sufficient to convince the Sultan to recall his troops, but this event also sparked a
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local anti-French jihād, or struggle, that the Sultan was once again persuaded to support,
and that would culminate in an extremely short war in August 1844.71
Throughout this incident, the British had been negotiating with the Sultan to stop
his support for the resistance movement,72 but Abdul Rahman was receiving so much
pressure from the movement’s leaders to support it that, without direct British
intervention in Moroccan policy, he was unable to comply with British wishes. When the
Makhzan sued for peace in 1844, the British were there to mediate the terms of the Treaty
of Tangier73 to ensure the French did not make any gains that would give them an
advantage over the British. This British negotiation was orchestrated by Britain’s ConsulGeneral in Morocco, Edward Drummond Hay.
British influence within Morocco grew throughout the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s.
British diplomats, particularly John Drummond Hay, Edward’s son and successor,
pressured the Makhzan to resist the expansion of French influence within the kingdom
and to continue enacting policies favorable to British economic needs—namely, greater
Makhzan control over the piratical populations of the Rif area in northern Morocco, a
policy of appeasement and passivity in nearly every international dispute, and reducing
import and export tariffs.74 Drummond Hay helped introduce the Treaty and Convention
on Commerce and Navigation between Britain and Morocco in 1856, which abolished
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most monopolies, reduced import duties, and fixed a maximum on export duties,75 all of
which gave Britain exclusive advantages in trade with Morocco, much to the chagrin of
many Moroccan notables who prospered from trade monopolies and duty taxes. This
treaty “sealed British hegemony in Morocco for a generation.”76 It also benefitted the
British position that, because of the disruption caused by the 1848 Revolution in France,
the French positions of Consul-General and Secretary in Morocco were reassigned nine
times throughout Drummond Hay’s tenure,77 which resulted in a drop in France’s
influence in the country.
Morocco’s importance in British foreign policy also increased when a new
waterway was created to facilitate travel to Asia. Construction on the Suez Canal began
in 1859. Designed by a Frenchman and dug out by Egyptian manpower, the canal’s usage
was dominated by Britain when it opened in 1869. It provided the British with much
quicker access to India, the gem in its imperial crown, by eliminating the need to sail all
the way around the southern tip of Africa. With the opening of the canal, control of the
Strait of Gibraltar became even more important for the British, and thus the strategic
value of its influence in Morocco increased to a level beyond that of merely blocking
French expansion.
Britain maintained its efforts to avoid foreign occupation of Morocco throughout
the 1860s and 1870s. Morocco was forced at the conclusion of the Hispano-Moroccan
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War in 1861 to sign a treaty with the Spanish agreeing to pay 100 million pesetas in
indemnity,78 but British help in negotiating the treaty, as well as internal instability in
Spain throughout the 1860s and early 1870s, prevented the Spanish from furthering their
sphere of influence beyond Ceuta and Melilla in the north. France was likewise occupied
with problems at home and in Algeria during this time.79 The British gained influence in
another sector of Morocco when Sultan Sidi Mohammed and his son Moulay Hassan
sought to reform the army after its defeat by the Spanish. The Makhzan began purchasing
firearms from Britain in 1869 and turned to the British to train its recruits starting in
1870.80
Britain retained a strong influence in Morocco through the turn of the century.
Although Drummond Hay’s attempts in 1880-1883 at revising the 1856 treaty failed,
Morocco’s sultans continually sought British counsel and support in affairs both foreign
and domestic until the Cambon-Lansdowne Agreement was signed by the British and
French governments in 1904. The British government was responsible for organizing the
Madrid Conference in 1880, a conference held among the major European powers to
address the issue of the status and rights of Moroccan proteges, native Moroccans serving
international employers.81 The Makhzan utilized British assistance in reforming its fiscal
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and administrative systems in 1901.82 And in the following year, Walter B. Harris, an
English resident in Morocco and author of two texts that will be examined in this project,
played the role of mediator in resolving a dispute between the Makhzan and Wazzan
sharifs regarding the abolition of the Wazzani tax exemptions.83
It was around this time that British influence began waning as that of the French
continued growing. When the Makhzan’s debts reached the level that it had to seek an
international loan, it signed an agreement with a French bank in December 1901.84 The
Abu Himara revolt 1901 to 1903 opened the door for French reforms, as it displayed to
the Makhzan that the British program of reforms had failed.85 Finally, Britain gave way to
French hegemony in Morocco with the Cambon-Lansdowne Agreement of 1904. The
agreement stipulated that France renounce her claims on Egypt for freedom of action
within Morocco,86 and ended the Anglo-French rivalry in North Africa.

Conclusion
The narrative of Amazigh society in Morocco is one of consistent and repeated
conquest. The Imazighen were, and remain, viewed as a mysterious “other” by observers
from outside their own society. At certain moments throughout history, they were
partially assimilated into the new-coming society, such as in the initial Islamic conquests
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of the seventh and eighth centuries. At others, they were marginalized or faced
repression, such as the Arabization of Morocco during the independence era. Mohammed
VI has seemingly ushered in a new era of liberalization and Amazigh rights since his
ascendance to the throne in 1999. The introduction of Tamazight-language instruction
into schools, the establishment of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, and the
inclusion of Tamazight as an official national language suggest that this new era might
bridge the gap between Arab and Amazigh in Morocco.
It might seem strange to focus on the British when analyzing European influence
in Morocco. The French seem the more logical choice, as they ruled the country as a
protectorate for forty-four years, and French remains the second language of the majority
of Morocco’s urban population. Nonetheless, the British Empire initiated European
contact and conversation with Morocco when it was still closed off to the Western world.
The British, then, were the first Europeans to encounter the Imazighen, and their
impressions and writings laid the foundation for their treatment in all ensuing literature,
and possibly even their political and social treatment by Morocco’s recent rulers.
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Chapter 2: Regarding British Sources
The sources used in this thesis to evaluate perceptions of Amazigh society come
from two distinct time periods and locations: Britain in the nineteenth century, and
contemporary Morocco. This chapter will examine the former group; I used British
sources published during the time of Britain’s most significant influence in the country
(1820s-1900), and works of both scholarly and popular nature.
The sources I used to inspect British perceptions of Moroccan Imazighen ranged
from scholarly articles to travel narratives to one dramatic novel. The main benefit these
sources bring to this thesis is their first-person perspective. With the exception of the
Mayo novel, each text is written from the personal experiences and the perspective of the
author, in several cases recounting his travels within the country. Rather than coming
from a secondary source, the perceptions and characterizations on display in these articles
come directly from first-hand experiences. Even the two works that do not feature direct
dealings within Morocco provide useful insights into the authors’ opinions. Hodgson’s
“Translation of a Berber Manuscript” is inherently affected by the act of his translation,
as no translator can remove his/her voice from the resulting translation; and Mayo’s The
Berber, though a novel, contains numerous breaks from the course of the narrative
wherein the author provides his own insights, rather than those of his characters. A
second reason I chose these specific sources is because of their accessibility. The fact that
these articles and books were archived and preserved supports the argument for their
importance and readership within Great Britain.
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The academic articles were the shortest sources, the longest consisting of twentyseven pages, and discussed Amazigh society and culture only tangentially. They generally
focused on geographic facts and descriptions of the country and its inhabitants, akin to
the information available on the CIA World Factbook. This made physical descriptions
relatively easy to obtain, but descriptions of cultural practices and traditions were seldom
to be found. The popular sources I used were all full-length books; two are travel
narratives written for popular publishing rather than publishing in a journal, and the third
is a novel. These sources contain many more depictions of Amazigh life and customs
than the academic sources, and were thus much more useful in analyzing British
perceptions of Amazigh-ness throughout this time period. What separates the two groups
of sources is where they were published. The academic sources were published in official
societies in Great Britain, while the popular sources appeared in magazines or were full
length books published for public consumption. By using sources of both kinds, I was
able to create a cohesive perception of the Moroccan Amazigh within British society as a
whole rather than just one part of it.

Academic Sources
“Translation of a Berber Manuscript” appeared in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society of Great Britain and Ireland in 1837. The manuscript itself was written by an
Amazigh man named Sidi Ibrahim ben Muhammed under the direction of W. B.
Hodgson, a former consul at Algiers, and therefore its contents were subjected to his
review before publication. The article contains several snapshots of towns and villages in
the Moroccan countryside, sometimes featuring the author’s narrative of an event, such as
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the capturing and enslavement of Christian sailors or the defiance of a new Sultan, and
other times merely giving geographic information about the town and surrounding region,
such as population and number of troops there, as well as resources available. Though the
article nominally addresses an Amazigh manuscript, it is often unclear in its text if the
groups it is discussing are Imazighen or not; the only passages that are for sure are the
story about the Aith Hamed and a section entitled Aith Amran —as Aith or Ait is the
Tamazight word for “tribe”—, in addition to a section about the tribe Tegergust. In
contrast to the other sources, the Amazigh groups mentioned in this article are those
living in the Sus region near and on Morocco’s southern Atlantic coast. The other sources
I encountered focus mainly on the Imazighen of the Atlas Mountains and, to a limited
extent, those of the Rif in Morocco’s north. The groups described in this source seem to
be a mix of Arab tribes and Amazigh tribes, as I found tribe names in both the Arabic
language and dialects of the Tamazight language.
Joseph Thomson’s “A Journey to Southern Morocco and the Atlas Mountains”
was first read at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of
Geography in November of 1888, and was published the following year. Thomson, the
namesake of the Thomson’s gazelle, was a Scottish geologist and explorer. Though he is
more well-known today for his travels in eastern and southern Africa, he went on an
expedition to Morocco in 1888.87 This article chronicles Thomson’s journey to the
interior of Morocco, an empire that, despite its extreme proximity to Europe, had many
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parts that “remained as completely unexplored as many districts in the heart of Africa.”88
Thomson began his article with an acknowledgement of other expeditions into the
country’s interior; he actually referenced Joseph Hooker’s excursion in 1871, which is the
subject of another source that will be discussed below. Thomson’s mentioning of the
Imazighen is quite sparse; this is partially due to a letter from the Sultan forbidding him
and his party from entering the mountains, which suggests a less-than-firm authority over
the population of the mountains by the Sultan. In fact, he never actually mentions them as
Imazighen or Berbers by name. Rather, he refers to them as “armed mountaineers,” and
only makes note of them when they actively barred his attempts to reach various peaks of
the Atlas Mountains. However, from descriptions found in other sources, one can infer
that he is indeed speaking of Imazighen in these instances.
The final article of academic nature I used is “The Berbers of Morocco,” written
by Walter B. Harris and published in The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of
Great Britain and Ireland in 1898. Harris was a long-term resident of Morocco, settling
there in 1887 when he was only 19.89 He would grow up to become a writer for The
Times and, because of his access to Moroccan royalty, played a role in European
domination of Morocco in the early twentieth century.90 Additionally, his physical
appearance allowed him to pass as a native Moroccan, granting him the ability to access
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otherwise off-limits areas of the country.91 In contrast to the other articles available from
this time period, Harris’ piece seeks to explicitly discuss Morocco’s aboriginal ethnic
group. This article, despite its short length, gives more detailed characterizations of
Moroccan Imazighen than do any of the preceding sources. It not only acknowledges the
linguistic differences between Imazighen and Arabs (and between different Amazigh
groups), it also gives glimpses and insight into various characteristics of Amazigh society
and mindset, discussing such facets as religion, warfare, and honor.

Popular Sources
The earliest popular source I utilized is a novel written by William Starbuck
Mayo, a successful novelist in London, in 1850 titled The Berber; or, The Mountaineer of
the Atlas: A Tale of the Sallee Rovers. This novel reads like a modern soap opera,
featuring long-lost brothers, Spanish maidens kidnapped by pirates, a mysterious
handsome Amazigh chieftain, and an insane sultan. Throughout the course of the novel,
Mayo takes breaks from the narrative to address the reader directly, breaching the literary
fourth wall. These excerpts served as opportunities to for the author to clarify possible
points of confusion for the average reader, such as the governmental structure of the
Moroccan Kingdom, the system of royal tribute, and points of Amazigh culture important
to the story. It is these excerpts, in conjunction with the parts of the novel centered around
the Amazigh characters of the story, that provided valuable insight into how British
civilians imagined Moroccan Imazighen at that time.
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A second popular source I used is “Morocco,” an article published in New
Monthly Magazine in 1860. It discusses the kingdom of Morocco, its geography, and
inhabitants in the context of the then-ongoing Hispano-Moroccan War. The author’s name
is not given, but the magazine’s editor was William Harrison Ainsworth, who had been a
historical novelist before purchasing the magazine. The article begins, and is littered, with
a scathing harangue of the Moroccan government, and to a limited extent, its people. It is
clear that the author supports the colonization of Morocco by Britain, as it would allow
the British to civilize the Moroccan people. The article gives geographic insight to the
contested territory in northern Morocco, from the Spanish cities of Melila and Ceuta on
the Mediterranean coast down to Rabat and Salé on the Atlantic to Fez and Meknes in the
country’s interior. The minimal attention the author gives to Morocco’s Imazighen is in
the context of possible additional opposition forces for the Spanish to face if the
Imazighen were to interpret the Hispano-Moroccan war as an attack on Islam.
The third British source from the nineteenth century is Journal of a Tour in
Marocco and the Great Atlas by Joseph Dalton Hooker, a renowned British botanist,
explorer, and friend of Charles Darwin. This travel narrative, published in 1878, was
popular enough to merit mentioning in Thomson’s work about his own trip to Morocco’s
interior decades later. Divided into numbered chapters, Hooker’s narrative chronicles the
voyage he and his companions took across the Atlas Mountains. En route to their
destination, they also crossed the Rif mountains, though Hooker paid more attention to
the characteristics of the mountains themselves than to those of their inhabitants. As a
botanist, Hooker’s principal goal on this journey was to collect, classify, and categorize
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the wildlife he encountered in Morocco. His recognition and documentation of Amazigh
appearances, behaviors, and practices were only secondary objectives, but because of the
length and detail of his narrative, he still provides profitable information to the subject of
this thesis.
The most recent piece I evaluated is the book Tafilet: The Narrative of a Journey
of Exploration in the Atlas Mountains and the Oases of the North-West Sahara, published
in 1895 and written by Walter B. Harris. Harris’ objective was to cross the Atlas
Mountains to Tafilet, a small oasis town on the edge of the Sahara, where the Sultan had
gone for a rare visit. His excursion brought him into contact with several different
Amazigh communities, and therefore his writing offers the reader a glimpse into British
understanding of the differences between Morocco’s various Amazigh groups. Though
not an anthropologist by training, Harris’ observations in this narrative are the closest of
these sources to a modern ethnography. Unlike the other sources, this book also contains
several pictures of both the landscape and the people Harris and his company
encountered whilst in Morocco.

Trends within Academic Sources
Among the scholarly sources, the only facets of Amazigh identity commonly
discussed were their propensity for violence and their lower level of civilization. These
factors, it can be inferred, were the most pronounced (read: different, or exotic) features
in the eyes of the British travellers. The near-constant state of conflict in Amazigh society
seems to have struck a chord in this collection of sources. This could be either because
the authors found it so strange and foreign, or because they identified so strongly with it,
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but on a deep, hidden level (many of the British projects of colonization involved violent
suppression, not to mention all of wars in which the nation had been embroiled
throughout its history). One facet of Edward Said’s theory about Orientalism is the belief
that Eastern culture embodied the desires and urges that were repressed in Western
societies. That is why such scenes of violence, along with sexuality (which really did not
come up in these writings on Morocco) are so ubiquitous in literature on “the Orient” —
writing about the East gave the Western traveler the opportunity to openly discuss these
intimate, suppressed impulses.92
The British scholarly writers also altogether noted the different makeup of
Amazigh civilization, which they interpreted as inferior to their own, as well as the rest of
Europe. The Morocco that the British encountered had not gone through the Industrial
Revolution, and the Imazighen did not live in Morocco’s largest cities as the British
societal elites and academics did. The rural, subsistence lifestyle of the Imazighen was a
product of historical marginalization by the numerous civilizations which had subjugated
the region, and the British saw it as second-rate. They equated the differences between
Amazigh society and their own as objective faults.

Trends within Popular Sources
These sources were much longer in form than the scholarly articles, and therefore,
the authors had more room to note and discuss the aspects of Amazigh society that they
found peculiar and conspicuous. Among the popular sources, all of the authors noted the
variability amongst the Imazighen, the animosity between the Imazighen and their Arab
92
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neighbors, and the unique form of Islam practiced by the Imazighen, in addition to the
propensity for violence and lower level of civilization previously discussed in the
scholarly sources.
The British writers noticed the regional and tribal differences among the Amazigh
groups they encountered. Just as there were and remain regional differences among the
cities of Great Britain, so there were and still are among the various Amazigh groups of
Morocco. Though they did not see the Imazighen as equals, these writers recognized in
them a level of civilization close enough to their own to be nuanced and diverse rather
than a single, uniform entity.
The British authors of popular sources also all commented on the antipathy
between the Imazighen and the Arabs within Morocco. The ubiquitous acknowledgement
of this hostility suggests that the relative level of the intensity of the animosity was quite
high, otherwise it might have been overlooked. As with the references to violence in
general, this consistent recognition of enmity is so popular either because it was seen by
the writers as something quite foreign, or, alternatively, because it mirrored an aspect of
British society that was otherwise masked or misrecognized. One need only to review
Britain’s history with France to see a dictionary definition of animosity.
The version of Islam practiced by the Imazighen was yet another point commonly
acknowledged by popular British writers. The British were familiar with Islam from their
dealings with the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, but the way in which the Imazighen
practiced Muhammad’s religion was quite unlike these more orthodox interpretations.
Had the Imazighen practiced a more familiar style of Islam, British authors would likely
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have noted that they were Muslims and moved on from the subject, as it would have
required no further explanation. However, the use and place of religion in Amazigh
societies, in addition to their intermingling of older traditions with Islam, gave rise to
questions about the place of religion in British society, where wars had been waged and
monarchs beheaded on the basis of religion alone.
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Chapter 3: Findings in British Sources
In this chapter, I provide more extensive and in-depth analysis of the primary
source material from nineteenth century Great Britain. This analysis is organized by
theme or characteristic, with examples provided within each section from the various
sources.
To begin, it is worth noting that the British did in fact differentiate between Arab
and Amazigh in Morocco. Rather than simply lumping into one group all the inhabitants
of this “China of the West”93 (a likewise foreign land that lay much closer to home than
China itself), the British nationals who wrote about Morocco acknowledged the
distinction between the two groups. In fact, several travelers made the Imazighen the
subject of anthropological and ethnographic study. This is logical, considering the policy
of divide-and-rule that they implemented quite successfully throughout their empire in
such places as India and Nigeria. Following this policy, British representatives sought to
understand the relationship between Morocco’s Arab and Amazigh populations in order
to manipulate it to their advantage. To do this, they subjected Morocco’s inhabitants to
constant comparison in their writings; most descriptions of Amazigh life, society, and
even appearance are given vis-à-vis the Arabs. The differences noted between the two in
the sources were both of a superficial nature, regarding dress and appearance, and more
substantive, addressing cultural and behavioral distinctions between the two populations.
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Dress and Appearance
The dress and appearance of Imazighen was the first thing British authors noticed.
The travel narratives of Joseph Hooker and Walter Harris give lengthy descriptions of the
clothing of Morocco’s natives. Hooker describes the hooded, goat-hair cloaks worn by
the men in the Atlas mountains, which Harris would later identify as “khanif or haidus,”94
as “somewhat looser than the Moorish [here understood to mean “Arab”] jellabia.”95
Harris also described the garments of the Imazighen as “much curtailed about the legs,
and instead of the draggling and mud-stained skirts of the Arab there appeared the sinewy
limbs of the children of the mountains.”96
British writers extended the descriptive comparisons between Moroccan Arabs
and Imazighen by addressing their physical characteristics and traits. The general trend in
the sources was that British authors viewed the Imazighen as physically superior to their
Arab neighbors. As one author cited, “Their mode of life renders them more robust and
active than their neighbours of the plains.”97 Hooker described the women as being
“rather better favoured than those we had seen in the lower valley,”98 and Harris
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described the men as “good sturdy fellows… always laughing and running races”99 and
being of “handsome face and fine bearing.”100
Harris also offered a quick sketch of an Amazigh salt mine that further illustrates
this characterization of the Imazighen as superior physical specimens. While traveling
with his company near Ouarzazate, Harris came upon a salt mine being worked by a
number of Amazigh men and their mules. He described the men as “half-nude men with
their rough picks hewing away and singing the while,”101 but the relevant part of the story
comes when Harris describes the descent from the mine. The mine was situated above the
road on a steep precipice, but man and beast both were able to navigate the treacherous
terrain with ease and regularity— “The manner in which both man and beasts succeeded
in descending seemed to us, as we stood and watched, incredible, yet we were told that he
made the journey every day to this spot in the face of the precipice.”102

Warlike Character
Though Imazighen dress and appearance was the first observation of British
writers, the most frequently noted characterization of Imazighen by far was that of the
excessively violent and militant mountaineer. This portrayal was present in every source I
encountered. Various aspects of this representation were highlighted differently in each
text, but the general idea of the Amazigh as excessively violent seems to have been
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universally acknowledged in the British media of the nineteenth century. There were
three general characterizations of Amazigh warlike character. First was the society and
psychology of Imazighen in general, being obsessed with weaponry and acclimated to
daily skirmishes and warfare. Second were the numerous conflicts between the
Imazighen and their Arab neighbors. And third was the state of near constant warfare
amongst the Amazigh tribes themselves.
The British depicted the Imazighen of Morocco as comprising a society infatuated
with weaponry that had incorporated violence into its daily routines. One author
described them as “a warlike and semi-barbarous race,”103 and Mayo, in an authorial
aside to his readers, described Morocco’s Amazigh population as “very fond of their
weapons, and of military games and exercises.”104 Harris, too, described them as living,
“a wild gipsy life, at war with all men.”105 Hooker noted one practice that shows how
every societal convention of the Imazighen he encountered had a dual purpose—
practical and tactical. Hooker says:
The destructive practice of setting fire to the brushwood is the sole cause that
prevents the northern slopes of the Great Atlas from being clothed with valuable
timber. The motive is not only the desire to obtain pasture for sheep and goats,
but also to deprive an enemy of cover for ambush during the frequent skirmishes
that occur between neighboring tribes.106
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Hodgson shared another anecdote that highlights Amazigh society’s emphasis on
warfare. Though children were exempt from the violence of warfare and skirmishes in
Amazigh society, it was common practice that, according to Hodgson’s article, “when a
boy arrives at the age prescribed for the fast of Ramadhan, his father purchases for him a
musket and a sword.”107 Harris echoes this sentiment in his writing, noting that during
conflicts, “no quarter is given, any one old enough to carry a gun or dagger, the two
weapons of the country, [is] considered fair game.”108 This particular right of passage
turned out to be of great importance, for Hodgson’s article goes on, claiming, “no fullgrown person ever goes to it without his musket and his sword.”109 Perhaps it is for this
reason that, when the Imazighen of the Rif gathered for market days, they were
invariably, “‘occasions of fierce and incessant quarrels among themselves, when it is not
unusual for two or three persons to be left dead on the spot.’”110 Amazigh weapons
proved to be used for more than market violence. One author wrote about the Imazighen
he encountered, “The Berbers are all hunters and practised shots, being especially handy
with their guns, upon which they expend large sums of money, and which they twirl into
the air, catching them again with great dexterity.”111 Hooker emphasized this love of guns
over other gifts in his narrative. According to him, the Imazighen were not interested in
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the musical boxes and watches that he and his companions tried to give them. Rather,
“fire-arms, not necessarily of modern make, are far more welcome than any other
gifts.”112 So great was the desire of the Imazighen for weapons that some were even
pushed to the point of stealing. One of Walter Harris’ men had a powder-horn made of
the horn of a wild Barbary sheep set in brass and silver stolen from him.113 Harris also
offered another depiction of Moroccan Imazighen as a war-obsessed society when he
delivered his opinion that “the Berber is never happy unless he has some one to kill, or is
running a risk of being shot himself from behind some stone.”114
The second aspect of Amazigh warlike character these British texts emphasized
was the frequent fighting amongst their various tribes. Harris described Morocco as “A
country where blood feuds are forever being waged.”115 Hodgson’s translation text noted
how such consistent conflict affected tribal dynamics when writing about the Tegergust
tribe, which had settled by the Sus River. According to the article, “The tribe is divided
into three sections, which fight with each other. They have each a Shaikh. These three
divisions of the tribe are in a state of constant hostility.”116 The intra-tribal conflicts could
go on for most of the year before being settled— “They go to each other’s villages at
night and steal cattle and horses, and kill each other. During the day, they station two
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horsemen, as guards, between the villages. The villagers thus remain at war, for months,
or a whole year, until the son of Ben Naser comes through the country, and arranges the
difficulties of all the villages.”117 Mayo echoed this sentiment of frequent Amazigh vs.
Amazigh conflict in his novel, saying, “the Berbers are divided into tribes, between
whom interminable feuds exist, some of which date back as far as the era of Mohammed.
An almost continued state of hostility is the consequence.”118 According to Harris, such is
the mutual animosity amongst the Imazighen that “marriage, or even cordiality, between
the tribes is unknown.”119 In fact, Harris went on to say that hostilities are not just on the
tribal level, but, “village against village, and even household against household… it was
the custom for neighbours to fire at one another from their windows and roofs whenever
the opportunity presented itself.” Harris even ventured so far as to suggest that the
Amazigh societies of Morocco caused their own decline. He stated that “[t]he constant
state of warfare existing amongst the Berber people has no doubt caused this
disintegration of the larger tribes, by the changing, acquisition, and losing of territory.”120
So prevalent was fighting among some Amazigh groups that they had to change the
location of the market to minimize the opportunity for conflict:
The object of [the market’s] situation is that the spot is the only one clear from
the forest, and therefore attack and fighting is less likely to occur than would be
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the case amongst the palm-groves; for, ignoring their constant wars with the
Berbers of the surrounding country, the tribes and even villages of Askura are
continually fighting amongst themselves.121

Harris reiterated his opinion of the Imazighen in his second work on Morocco.
Referring to their conflicts as a state of “eternal war,” he is quoted, “It is a case not only
of tribe against tribe and family against family, but often even of individual against
individual.”122
The last characterization of Moroccan Amazigh warlike character is that of the
Amazigh fighting against the outsider. Frequently, this outsider is the Arab-dominated
Moroccan state, but

there are also several references to historical battles with the

Spanish. Even the British travelers, who carried letters of permission from the sultan,
were at some risk. Thomson and his party were traveling through the mountains when
they came across “an excited crowd of armed mountaineers, all of them making
threatening gestures, but two especially furiously attempting to extricate themselves from
more peaceable companions, with the very evident object of shooting me.”123 Although
the sultan exercised nominal sovereignty over the Amazigh inhabitants of Morocco, the
two parties in fact had a quite tenuous relationship. In the provinces of Rif and Garet,
Richardson observed “the emperor exercises an extremely precarious authority” over the
region’s “warlike and semi-barbarous race of Berbers.”124 Hodgson’s translation text tells
121

id., pg 136-137

122

Walter B. Harris, “The Berbers of Morocco,” pg 64

123

Thomson, pg 10

124

James Richardson in “Morocco,” pg 15

!45

of a three-day battle between an Amazigh tribe and an armed unit of Moroccan troops on
the Elgas River. Though they fought fiercely, the Imazighen lost the battle, and the heads
of fourteen of their chiefs.125 William Starbuck Mayo referenced the hostility of the
Moroccan Imazighen in his novel as well. According to the narrator, there settled outside
of the capital city of Meknes an Amazigh tribe called the Ait Amore, who were much
feared for having “defeated a body of troops that the soltan had sent against them, and
had even issued from their strongholds in the hills, and were ravaging the country west of
the capital.”126 Such violence against imperial troops was, at times, escalated enough to
make even the sultan feel insecure. One author described the situation thus: “‘In a
country like Morocco, of widely distinct races and hostile tribes, all naturally detesting
each other, the emperor finds in [his cavalry] his only safety.’”127
However, the Amazigh communities seem to have been able to put aside their
animosity towards their Arab neighbors when it came to defending their shared religion.
For the sake of Islam, British authors noted that they would redirect their violence
towards anyone who threatened the religion. For instance, during the Hispano-Moroccan
War of 1859-1860, the two groups fought alongside one another against this common
enemy and outsider:
In the case of the proclamation of a holy war, as in the present instance, the
Berber tribes, including the Amazight, the Shuluh, as well as all the other Kabayil
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of the distant Atlas, and even the warlike Tuwarik of the desert, swell the number
of the enemy by some hundreds of thousands of sober, intrepid, and enduring
fanatics.128

Furthermore, the Imazighen made up a great part of the Muslim forces that
conquered Andalusia in the eighth century. Mayo acknowledges this fact in his novel.
When one of the story’s main characters, a young Spanish girl, finds herself whisked
away from danger by a mysterious stranger, she inquires about her rescuer’s identity. He
reveals his Amazigh heritage, and suggests that she, too, likely has Amazigh blood. In
response to her disbelief, the man tells her of the Muslim conquest of Spain, saying:
… ’twas the Berbers who conquered Spain. ’Twas the Berbers, in the gallant
bands of Tarik Ibn Zeyed and his master Mirza Ibin Nasseyr, who overthrew the
gothic monarchy in Spain. ’Twas the Berbers who composed the vast array that,
under Yusef Ibn Tashfir, defeated the hosts of Alfonzo on the Field of Zalaca.
’Twas the Berbers who, under the great Yakoob Almanzor, routed the king of
Castile on the plains of Alarcos, and who swept triumphant through the country
to the hills of Asturias; and it was the Berbers who followed Mohammed Ibn
Abdallah by hundreds of thousands to the fatal field of Las Narvas.129

The Imazighen battled the Spaniards once more at the end of the nineteenth
century. Harris commented on their military success, saying, “That the Riffis, in common
with the other members of the Berber people, are possessed of great courage there is no
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doubt, for the manner in which they fought and practically routed the Spaniards in the
vicinity of Melilla in 1894 clearly demonstrated the fact.”130
When encountering all of this evidence, one is left with the impression that British
authors traveling in the country viewed Amazigh societies in Morocco at this time as
merely collections of warriors who resided together. They did not note any division of
labor or education system, but instead focused on the occurrences of violence. British
travelers believed that violence was a common and integral part of life in these
communities, and that “bloodshed and murder [were] of everyday occurrence.”131

Distinctions between Different Amazigh Groups
In addition to recognizing the difference between Arabs and Imazighen, the
sources further documented the distinctions between various Amazigh groups. They
identify four distinct Amazigh groups within the empire of Morocco. This is their
distribution, according to Harris:
(i.) Shelha proper, as spoken generally throughout the Atlas, from the tribes of
Ghiata, Aït Yussi, and Beni Mgild, to the southeast of Fez, as far along the Atlas
as about due south of Marakesh; (ii.) Riffía, spoken by the Riffis inhabiting the
mountains of the north coast, from the south-west of Tetuan to the French frontier
of the province of Oran; (iii.) Susía, spoken form along the Atlas and the Sus
valley to the south, from where Shelha proper terminates, about due south of
Marakesh, to the Atlantic coast; and (iv.) Drauía, the common tongue all along
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the valley of the Wad Draa from Mesgita, where the junction of the Dads and
Idermi form that river to where it flows into the Atlantic.132

Differences between these groups are both social and physical, while their
linguistic differences were only noted by Walter Harris in his Tafilet narrative. In Mayo’s
novel, the chieftain of the Beni Mozarg explains this to the Spanish damsel he rescues
when she tells him that she thought all Imazighen were uncivilized. “‘Whoever told you
so, señorita, does them great injustice. True, there are very different degrees of
civilization prevailing among the numerous tribes and families into which they are
divided. The Beni Mozarg, a branch of the great tribe of Ait Amore, are as far removed
from barbarism as the inhabitants of any district of your own Spain.’”133
Even neighboring tribes can have significant differences, as Hooker
acknowledged when he wrote, “...remarks àpropos of the Berbers of Dads are not equally
applicable to those of Aït Atta for instance, though these two tribes are neighbors.”134 He
went on to remark “how impossible a task it would be to enter at any length into the
peculiarities of a race which at different points presents such vastly different
characteristics, both in the physical aspect of the country they inhabit and in their
manners and customs.”135 Even geographic features received different names from
different groups— “a mountain known here by one title is a few miles farther on spoken
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of by an entirely different one.”136 The tribes were so disconnected that, as noted above,
“marriage, or even cordiality, between the tribes is unknown.”137
Additionally, there is great phenotypic variability among the Imazighen of
Morocco. In one scene of Mayo’s novel, the sultan is concerned about the activities of an
Amazigh chieftain whose tribe resides within a day’s ride of the capital city of Meknes,
but whom none of his advisers had ever seen. One of them claimed that he is almost
black in skin color, but the kaid (essentially a minister, or deputy) of the gardens objected
stating, “‘No; he is white, with fair hair: the Beni Mozarg are the whitest of the tribes;
you can tell them in a moment from all other Berbers who throng the socco on market
days.’”138 Therefore, the reader is left to infer that Amazigh skin color can run the gamut
from light to dark.

At Odds with Arabs
Another prominent characteristic British authors noted was the animosity felt by
Moroccan Imazighen toward the empire’s Arab inhabitants. Likely influenced by their
experiences during and after the Islamic conquests of the seventh century, or possibly
because of their conflicting ways of life, Morocco’s native population retained in
contempt of their Arab neighbors through the nineteenth century. I have already
referenced the frequent military conflicts between the two ethnic groups, but the
animosity that British writers describe is more complex than just physical violence.
136
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Harris suggests that this malice originated with the Arabs’ initial conquest of North
Africa, saying:
… for since the first conquest of the country by the invading Semites, a deadly
hatred has existed, which burns to-day as fiercely as ever, fanned into rebellion
and warfare whenever the dominating Arab power attempts to enforce tribute, or
practises some nefarious act of treachery, in which act the Moorish Government
is unequalled, upon the more confiding and more manly Berbers. Everything in
fact has tended through all these centuries to widen the breach between them,
until to-day, even when inhabiting common soil in the cities, the two races
remain entirely separate.139

One practice that solidified this animosity is that of Arabs monopolizing
resources. Hooker describes communities on the edge of the Sahara wherein Moroccan
Arabs had control over the valuable oases which make life there possible. This practice
pushed the Amazigh communities to thievery just to survive:
But when we learn that all the fertile oases of the Sahara have been monopolised
by a small class of Arab descent, who rest their claims on religious authority, it is
not apparent that there is any alternative for those who do not belong to the
privileged class; and, under such an anomalous condition of society, the energy
of the superior race will show itself in robbery, where that becomes the only
means of obtaining a livelihood.140

This disdain for Arabs was even inculcated in Amazigh children. According to
Harris, the children regularly built small dolls and figurines for playing. Oftentimes, these
figurines were cast as Arab horsemen, and, “[t]he horsemen were generally stood up a
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few yards off and pelted with stones until broken, the excited urchins meanwhile
shouting, ‘The Arabs! The Arabs!’—the common war-cry of their tribe when fighting the
latter race.”141
This ingrained malice was furthermore directed at members of the sultan’s
government, and even the sultan himself. Take for example the letter regarding tribute
that was delivered to the sultan’s bedchamber on the orders Casbin el Subah, leader of the
Ait Amoor, in Mayo’s novel:
To the powerful Muley Ismael, emperor of Morocco, Soos, and Tefilet, whom
God preserve in the paths of justice and mercy. Know that thy demand for more
tribute than the free Amazerg of the hills has of his own accord consented to pay
is unjust. Know also that thy design to ravage the country of the Ait Amoor is
known to me. Be warned in time and let there be peace between us. I fear you
not, and wish you well, in token whereof I pin this paper with my dagger to your
pillow and not to your heart.142

The disdain of the Moroccan Imazighen towards their nominal government is
demonstrated once more in Harris’ narrative. When the sultan planned to travel through a
region inhabited by a community of Imazighen, he was received out of obligation.
However, the “different and semi-conquered nation, would provide nothing or little for
his welfare, and whose reception, if hearty enough in words, would lack an real
enthusiasm.”143 Harris goes on later to point out the disdain of the Imazighen towards
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their fellow countrymen, even suggesting that if the Imazighen had it their way, they
would oust the Arabs completely from the land— “Certain it is that the deadly hatred still
existing between the two races is keenly alive to-day, and were the Arabs less strong, or
their position more open to attack, there is no doubt that they would have been ousted
long ago from so fertile and rich an oasis.”144

Strange Version of Islam
The one aspect of Arab society that the Imazighen have wholeheartedly
incorporated into their own is the religion of Islam. Before the Islamic conquests brought
Arabs from the east, most Imazighen of Morocco practiced either a pagan religion or
Christianity. However, since the Arabs swept across North Africa, the Amazigh
communities in Morocco have almost ubiquitously accepted Islam at least nominally.
Hodgson’s Tamazight translation article claims that one of the very limited number of
Tamazight-language books was a religious text:
The Shaikh Hamed ben Muhammed ben Naser, on whom be the blessings of
God! composed his book in the Shilha language, and called it the Book of the
Amazigh. This book treats of those duties which are of positive precept, and of
the Sunnah. It treats of the duties of fasting, and instructs as to what is lawful and
forbidden among men.145

Mayo also acknowledged the Amazigh acceptance of Islam in his novel. In one of
the sections where he leaves the story behind as narrator and writes directly to his
readers, he states, “Among the Berbers, in the present day, the Mohammedan religion
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prevails, mixed up, however, with many old peculiar notions and observances, some of
which unquestionably date their origin from the time when the whole of Northern Africa
was nominally Christian.”146 Harris states that, even though the Imazighen accepted the
religion of the Arabs, “they do not seem to be fanatical, and are altogether in their natures
much less passionate than their Arab neighbours.”147 The image this creates is of a society
that incorporates new, outside influences with its old, deeply-rooted practices in a form of
reconciliation between the two. According to Hooker, the Imazighen were rather lax in
their adherence to the Qur’anic dogma they had accepted, but they were extravagant in
their veneration of Islam’s saints, to the point that rivaled the Arabs. While traveling with
a company of Imazighen, they came across a shrine, and this was the reaction of the
company: “As we came in sight of the zaouia, each of our troop, Shelluh [Amazigh] as
well as Moor [Arab], commenced to recite prayers, and then, after prostrating himself on
the ground, with his face towards the sanctuary, proceeded to add a stone to certain heaps
that stood beside the track.”148
The other religious aspect that seemed of paramount importance to the Imazighen
Hooker encountered was the existence of djinns, or spirits. Hooker and his company
wanted to reach the peak of one of the mountains through which they were passing, but
the Amazigh companions with whom he was lodging wished for them not to approach it,
for they considered it hallowed ground. Hooker ignored their warnings, and when he and
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his associates approached it, and their Amazigh servants with them, a fierce storm broke
out. This greatly frightened his Amazigh men, and one of them proceeded to sacrifice the
chicken he was carrying with him— “We had not before noticed that one of the Shelluhs
carried with him a live cock under his arm. In a state of the utmost excitement, he now
proceeded to cut the animal’s throat, in order thus to appease the wrath of our
supernatural foes, then renewing the appeal to us to forego further provocation.”149

Anti-Christian/European
In addition to a strong disdain for Arabs, the British writers of the nineteenth
century frequently highlighted a perceived animosity of Imazighen towards Europeans. In
fact, at least one author conducted his entire journey through Morocco in the guise of an
Arab rather than reveal himself as a white European. In the sources I encountered, this
phenomenon was localized to the population of the region around the Rif mountains on
Morocco’s northern coastline, as opposed to the other regions of Morocco with
significant Amazigh populations. Hooker described the presence of a Christian on the
highest mountain as a “profanation.”150 Richardson issued a general warning to sailors
near north Morocco: “‘Should any unfortunate vessel strike on these coasts, the crew find
themselves in the hands of inhuman wreckers. No European traveller has ever visited
these provinces, and we may state positively that journeying here is more dangerous than
in the farthest wastes of the Sahara.’”151 Hodgson’s article shared with his readers a
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cautionary tale for Christians dealing with the tribe Aith Amran. According to the text, a
Christian vessel landed on the tribe’s shore, wanting to barter and trade with the
inhabitants. The tribe members agreed, and enticed all but four of the sailors to come
ashore to collect water for the return voyage. While they were away, the Imazighen sent a
small vessel of men to the Christian ship, who took it by force, killing two, and capturing
the other two. The tribe captured the rest of the Christians who had disembarked to gather
water, and sold the lot into slavery among the various neighboring tribes, as well as their
ship.152 Taking these readings together, the reader is left with an image of a strongly antiEuropean community in northern Morocco, where the Christian traveller had to fear not
only thievery of his possessions, but also being sold into slavery.

Lower Level of Civilization
The Imazighen of Morocco were portrayed as wild and uncivilized. The words
“mountaineer” and “tribesmen” were often used as replacement terms to refer to
Morocco’s aboriginal people in the majority of the sources I encountered. Hooker was
rather blunt in his appraisal: “But we were scarcely prepared to find that the utmost
excesses of barbarism are matters of daily occurence in a country so close at hand.”153
Harris, too, was quite direct: “They are honest, thrifty and shy, pleasant and goodnatured, but as a rule stupid.”154 To further his point, Harris also acknowledges the
illiteracy of the Imazighen, saying, “No writing in their tongue exists, though Riffía, as it
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is called, is when necessary written in Arabic characters.”155 Hodgson gives them a little
more credit, stating in his article that he knew of three Amazigh manuscripts,156 but even
this acknowledgement brings with it a sense of disapproval and patronization.
One way to portray a society as uncivilized is to present it and its members as
unchanging throughout the course of time. William Starbuck Mayo does just this when he
says of the Imazighen, “Such are the Berbers of the Atlas, in our day; and such in general,
have they ever been.”157 Walter Harris made a similar observation:
“They [Berbers southeast of Fez] seem to have lost none of their pristine
fierceness, and to have adopted none of the manners and customs of their
conquerors beyond their religion; for the brown tent in which they moved from
place to place long before the Arab invasion is still found amongst them, and
their traditions, pre-Arab, are still handed down from mouth to mouth.”158

Harris revisited and reinforced this idea of the Imazighen failing to make
advancements throughout the course of time in his writings three years later when he
said, “But the fact that they [the Berbers] have never come into contact with outside
influences, with the exception of such Arab ideas as have penetrated into their country,
must have tended much toward their retaining their primitive customs.”159
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The British depicted the Imazighen as primitive and less civilized in comparison
to their own society. The British considered a society to be civilized if it mirrored their
own, or that of another western European country. Richardson put his estimation of the
Imazighen quite plainly in one article, when he was quoted saying, “Had the British
government continued its occupation for half a century, and kept in check the Maroquine
tribes, it is probable that by this time the greater part of Morocco would have been under
British rule, when we might have founded a flourishing colony, from which all North
Africa might have received the elements of Christian civilisation.”160 Hooker, too, was of
the same mind, saying, “People constantly forget how wide the gap is that separates the
mind of a modern European from that of the inhabitant of a barbarous country.”161 He
returned to this perception later in his journal when he realized that the Imazighen
amongst whom he was traveling did not understand (or perhaps just didn’t care much for)
his purported reason for traveling, with was ecological surveying. He said of his hosts,
“To them one pursuit of civilised man is as unintelligible as another, and they can
conceive no other serious occupation for men not forced to labour than war or
hunting.”162
Although the British considered them to be of a lower order of civilization, they
did note several impressive architectural feats of the Imazighen. Hooker was impressed
by the irrigation infrastructure the Imazighen had built: “Throughout the valley we were
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struck by the proofs of native industry and skill given by the numerous irrigation
channels, such as one sees in Piedmont, and in the tributaries of the Rhone valley in
Switzerland.”163 However, other praise had a hint of condescension. Walter Harris, when
remarking about towers he saw in Amazigh communities, had this to say— “a rough
measurement of one of the towers gave an altitude of at least 70 feet, no mean height
when it is taken into consideration that they are built without any of the appliances we
know in Europe, and altogether without mortar or lime.”164

Conclusion
It is clear from these texts that British writers, and British society by extension,
sought to obtain a robust understanding of Amazigh society, whether for the sake of
scientific curiosity or for the sake of exploiting and controlling it. Rather than being
oversimplified, the image of the Moroccan Amazigh presented in the British media in the
nineteenth century is multi-faceted and complex. While there are certain facets that were
stressed above all others (militancy and lower level of civilization), these
characterizations of the Amazigh population of Morocco acknowledged that they were
more than just bloody war machines. According to these authors, the Imazighen had their
own cultural systems into which they integrated aspects of outside societies, such as
Islam. They also highlighted the hostility of the Imazighen towards both their Arab
neighbors and the Europeans just across the Strait of Gibraltar, recognizing that they were
two distinct feelings, rather than just a baseless attitude of outright hostility towards all
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non-Imazighen. Through all of these characterizations, the main overarching theme in
British depictions of Imazighen is an Amazigh animosity toward anyone understood to be
an “outsider.”
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Ch. 4: Regarding Contemporary Moroccan Sources
Morocco has recently borne witness to an Amazigh cultural movement.
Coinciding with the ascent of King Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999, this movement
has resulted in increased Amazigh visibility in Moroccan media. This increased visibility
makes it possible to discern how Moroccan society is interpreting the members and
activities of this cultural movement, which is focusing on obtaining equal rights as
Moroccan citizens. This chapter will examine how Moroccan media outlets are
representing and characterizing Amazigh activists in contemporary Morocco through five
news articles published in Moroccan media outlets in the past 3 years.

The Articles
The articles to be examined in this chapter all discuss recent events in Morocco
that involve Amazigh activists. They were chosen for their relevance to the topic of
Amazigh characterization in contemporary Morocco, their ease of access for the average
Moroccan, and their proximity to the Amazigh movement. The contemporary portion of
this thesis seeks to elucidate how current Moroccan media characterize Amazigh identity
in the context of the recent Amazigh rights movement, and these articles all provide
examples of events related to that movement. Additionally, these articles are popularly
available and easily accessible to anyone in Morocco with Internet access, the same
group that Moroccan Amazigh activists are trying to reach. Finally, the articles come
from popular news agencies located within Morocco itself. Tamazight-language news is
scarce in Morocco; there is one television news channel and a few radio stations, but
Tamazight-language print media is virtually non-existent. Most reporting on Amazigh
!61

issues is done in French or Arabic. Therefore this body of sources gives the closest
possible interpretation of the Amazigh rights movement in Moroccan popular media.
The first two articles come from the news outlet Hibapress, and both were
published in 2011. Hibapress is an independent news website that publishes in both
French and Arabic. The first article discusses the Amazigh New Year celebration of that
year, the beginning of the year 2961 according to the Amazigh calendar. According to the
article, the Middle Atlas Imazighen celebrated the new year by renewing their calls for
the consideration of the day, January 13, as a national holiday.165 The second Maghress
article focuses on an activist group called The Amazigh Spring. This group aims at
preparing for an Amazigh revolution, an “uprising for the sake of nobility, justice,
freedom, and true democracy,” but claims it will be an intellectual, rather than physical,
uprising.166 The third article was published in September 2014 by the outlet Akhbāruna
al-Maghribīyah, another online news agency. This company focuses on the Arab world in
general and Morocco in particular, publishing only in Arabic. The article details the abuse
of a group of elderly Amazigh men at the hands of Moroccan government personnel for
boycotting a poll conducted by the High Commission for Planning. The men were
boycotting to express their objection to the systematic isolation of their region, as well as
many other regions where Imazighen are found.167 Published in July 2014, the fourth
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article in this section comes from the company Akhbār al-Yaum, which is based in Saudi
Arabia, but covers all of the Middle East and North Africa. The article recounts the
breaking up and dispersal of a peaceful demonstration in Casablanca by Moroccan
government forces. The demonstration, held in front of the Algerian Consulate
headquarters, was held in a spirit of solidarity with Moroccan and Algerian Amazigh
participants condemning the mistreatment of the Mozabite people who reside in
Ghardaïa, Algeria, who were subjected to ethnic discrimination, crimes stemming from
Arabism, and even slaughter.168 The last article comes from the online newspaper
Hespress in August 2014. Hespress prides itself for being the first online newspaper in
Morocco, and its goal is to “provide accurate, balanced, and forward-thinking
information on the development of Morocco.”169 It highlights the Timalsah Carnival, a
festival thrown by the Amazigh associations of the Greater Dades region of southwestern
Morocco. “Timalsah” is the Amazigh word for their traditional robe, and the carnival was
a celebration of Amazigh culture, as well as the first step in an initiative to showcase the
cultural and tourist-attracting attributes of the region.170

Findings
These articles contain four important characterizations of contemporary Moroccan
Imazighen. The first two are found within the common theme of the first four articles,
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specifically the disparity between the Arabs and Imazighen and the non-violent Amazigh
support for equal status with and treatment by Morocco’s Arab majority. The third is the
way they identify as a group. Lastly is the importance they are placing on cultural aspects
of their identity, rather than just language.
One characteristic the British writers in Morocco in the 1800s noticed was a
social, economic, and political gap between the Arab and Amazigh populations. The fact
that Amazigh activist groups exist to support equal rights with the Arab population shows
that there remains, at the very least, a perception of an inequality between the two ethnic
groups. There is good evidence to support this perception. The Islamic New Year, but not
the Amazigh New Year, is a national holiday.171 Amazigh sheikhs in a village were
mistreated physically and verbally when they chose not to participate in a population
survey.172 There was no Tamazight-language television channel until the reign of
Morocco’s current king,173 while there have been channels in Arabic and French since the
television became popular in Morocco. Though the gap between the Arabs and Imazighen
in Morocco is shrinking, it still remains as an important aspect of the way the Amazigh
population identifies itself.
The second characteristic that is prevalent in the articles is the peaceful nature of
the Amazigh struggle for equal rights. In a largely Arabized country, Amazigh society has
been marginalized since coming under the jurisdiction of the Moroccan Makhzan. Rather
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than trying to achieve their goals through violence or intimidation, contemporary
Moroccan Amazigh activists are choosing to fight their battles through peaceful means of
protests, festivals, and political statements. This characterization is in direct contradiction
with the images of Amazigh culture provided in the British sources previously discussed,
which portrayed Imazighen as excessively violent. Rather than armed insurrection or
threats of violence, Amazigh groups are attempting to make themselves heard through
democratic means. King Mohammed VI has been instituting reforms in favor of Amazigh
rights since his ascension to the throne, the establishment of a Tamazight-language
television channel among them.174 This has helped create an atmosphere in which the
Imazighen believe they can effect change in their situation through official and legal
means.
Each Amazigh New Year provides one platform for peaceful demonstrating. In
addition to celebrating the holiday in 2011 with festivals of traditional songs and meals,
Amazigh activists used the occasion to renew calls for the inclusion of the Amazigh New
Year in the list of official Moroccan holidays.175 The activist group Amazigh Spring aims
to support the Amazigh case through “civil and pragmatic dialogue in an intellectual fight
far removed from extremism and bigotry.”176 The leaders of Tamazouzte who refused to
participate in a government survey in September of this year did so peacefully, even
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though they were not treated likewise.177 And even when protesting to denounce the
heinous maltreatment of the Mozabite people in Ghardaïa, Algeria, the Amazigh
demonstrators did so peacefully.178
By their insistence on non-violent means, Moroccan Amazigh groups are, whether
consciously or subconsciously, flipping the traditional narrative, casting the Moroccan
government as the instigator of violence rather than themselves. It was the Makhzan,
rather than the Amazigh groups, that first reached for violence in the cases presented in
two of these articles. When some of the sheiks of Tamazouzte, a small town outside of
Marrakech, refused to comply and participate in a population poll conducted by the High
Commission for Planning, they were subjected to “beating and acute physical assault
from a lieutenant colonel and men of his forces,” in addition to verbal abuses.179
Similarly, Makhzan forces swooped in to suppress the demonstration outside of the
Algerian consulate in Casablanca, confiscating many cell phones and cameras and
arresting one activist.180 In these instances, it was the members of the Makhzan, rather
than the Imazighen, who were the aggressors. While the Amazigh activists utilized
peaceful and democratic means to try to accomplish their goals, the Moroccan
government used violent and autocratic methods to suppress dissent and maintain the
status quo.
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A third characteristic of contemporary Moroccan Imazighen is in the ways that
they identify themselves as a group. Rather than stressing individual tribal affiliations, in
recent years Amazigh activists have increased their scope to the regional, and even
international level. This is evidenced by the solidarity between Moroccan and Algerian
Imazighen in their joint demonstration in front of the Algerian consulate in September,181
as well as the Timalsah Carnival in the Greater Dades region organized in August of this
year.182 The image of the Amazigh population existing in rival tribes constantly
contesting one another has eroded as Moroccan Imazighen have expanded their networks
in cooperative efforts to achieve greater gains toward their common goals.
Lastly, Morocco’s Amazigh citizens identify themselves by way of their dress and
culture. The traditional robes displayed at the Timalsah Carnival183 were displayed as a
symbol of Amazigh identity. This facet of identity echoes the observations of nineteenth
century British writers, which noted physical differences in dress to distinguish between
Arab and Amazigh. The Imazighen are also proud of cultural elements that were absent in
nineteenth century British media. The Imazighen pride themselves on having one of the
oldest calendars in the world,184 and celebrate their festivals and holidays with traditional
songs, dances, and meals.185 These facets of Amazigh culture were conspicuously absent
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from British writings in the nineteenth century, which instead focused more on Amazigh
dress and appearance, as well as conflicts among the Imazighen and between them and
the Arabs of Morocco.

Conclusion
After examining these articles, it is clear that Moroccan Amazigh activists are
trying to carefully portray themselves in a certain way. It is also clear that they are doing
so in an effort to cast off previous conceptions of Amazigh identity. However, with no
direct references to any previously conceived ideas about Amazigh identity, it is difficult
to state with any certainty where the source, or sources, of these ideas lie. Nonetheless, it
is clear that today’s Moroccan Imazighen wish to be understood as a peaceful group
intent on accomplishing their agenda through legal political means, in contrast to their
former characterization as an ethnic group that solves its problems with violence.
Additionally, rather than remaining a group that exists outside the boundaries of official
Moroccan society, Amazigh groups are working toward their equal inclusion within
Morocco, though a gap still remains. To that end, Moroccan Imazighen have expanded
their networks from the local tribal level to the regional, and even international, level.
Finally, although Morocco’s Amazigh population is seeking parity with their Arab
counterparts, they are retaining and celebrating their ethnic identity by their traditional
dress robes, which have been a symbol of their identity at least since the entrance of the
British into the country in the nineteenth century.
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Conclusion
There is a dearth of research regarding Moroccan Imazighen, and this project is
but a stepping stone toward amending that. Examining the similarities and differences
between these two pools of sources helps elucidate the amount of cultural influence the
British had within Morocco regarding perceptions and characterizations of the
Imazighen, in this particular case. In a broader perspective, such examination could lay
the groundwork for a blueprint for understanding how foreign countries can influence the
perception of minority groups in a target country without any sort of direct intervention.
The current Amazigh movement in Morocco is clearly reacting to
characterizations of the Amazigh population made by outsiders. It remains unclear
whether those characterizations are at all linked to the British pioneers who entered and
explored Morocco in the 1800s, but the nature of the relationship between their
characterizations of Imazighen and those of contemporary Moroccan news media
certainly merits further investigation. Because of the British Empire’s position in the
country— it was the first European country to establish any economic or political
relations with the Kingdom of Morocco, and therefore the British were the first nonAfricans to encounter any Imazighen in centuries— any possible British influence on
contemporary characterizations of Moroccan Imazighen warrants additional research.
In the sources examined, Amazigh activist groups presented an organized,
peaceful front intent on achieving their goals through legal means. In doing this, the
activists emphasized some aspects of their society and culture that resonate with British
observations from the nineteenth century, as well as others that do not. There was a clear
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link to and pride in their historic ties to the region, as well as their traditional dress, which
was noted extensively by the British. However, the traditional dances, songs, and food
they highlighted were not noted by the British authors.
A number of characterizations made by the British were actually contradicted by
the contemporary articles. First, the use of technology to expand and organize the
Amazigh movement noted by Moroccan news outlets displays an equal level of
“civilization” with that of the Arabs and Europeans, rather than one of a lower level.
British sources characterized Imazighen as delayed in the development of their society.
They noted the pervasive illiteracy in Amazigh society as one marker of this, in addition
to portraying Amazigh society as unchanging throughout the course of time. However, in
Moroccan sources, it is clear that these characterizations are no longer accurate. Amazigh
society has, in fact, changed since the nineteenth century. As noted by the contemporary
sources, Imazighen have assimilated into the Moroccan legal system and are using those
channels to accomplish their goals. This might have happened as a result of the
“Moroccanization” of the country after achieving independence in the 1950s. During that
time, the nation’s leaders were working to establish a post-colonial identity, and therefore
began viewing the Imazighen of the country as a part of the new nation and began
expanding the nation’s infrastructure— most notably the education system— to include
them.
Second, British writers stressed the individual familial and tribal ties of Amazigh
society, whereas the Moroccan news articles highlight a much larger sense of community
at the regional and even international level. One article highlights a regional celebration
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of their culture and society held by Amazigh activists. Another article depicts them
calling out to the international community for support in achieving their goals. This
request for international support also contradicts the British characterization of Amazigh
society as vehemently anti-European. This is likely attributable to changes within
Amazigh society since the time of the British writers, but even if that is the case, it
suggests that Amazigh society is capable of change and advancement.
Two characterizations of Imazighen by nineteenth century British writers were
neither truly supported nor contradicted in the contemporary articles. There is no mention
of the way in which Moroccan Imazighen practice, or do not practice, Islam or any other
religion. Additionally, animosity of Imazighen towards Arabs was neither highlighted nor
refuted; it seems that the only problem the Imazighen have with their neighbors is their
unequal status.
Though these current characterizations of Morocco’s Amazigh movement vary
vastly in their alignment, or lack thereof, with those of nineteenth century British writers,
the same topics appeared in both pools of sources, with only two exceptions: a unique
Amazigh version of Islam and Amazigh animosity towards Arabs. This strong link
suggests a correlation between the two. But simple correlation is not demonstrative of
causation. Further research into these characterizations could determine whether these
characterizations truly originated with the British, or if the British were biased by the
almost exclusively Arab Moroccan government. Additionally, further research could
determine whether the characterizations of the Imazighen in contemporary Morocco are
in fact reactive to past characterizations made by outsiders, such as the British, or perhaps
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the French during their era of colonization in North Africa, and if so, through which
channels such characterizations came. The most direct approach would be to interview
current Amazigh activists to elucidate what factors have motivated their characterizations
of themselves. It would also be intriguing to compare those results with interviews of
Moroccan Imazighen who do not identify as activists regarding their own
characterizations of Amazighité, the essence of Amazigh-ness. Such knowledge could
shed light on the amount of influence an outside nation can have on the perceptions of
minority ethnic groups within their own country, without any official policy of
colonization or intervention.
When I think back to those experiences with that Amazigh shop vendor now, two
things come to mind. First, I think of the stereotype: all hanūt employees are Imazighen.
It is invariably a disparaging stereotype based on ethnic differences. However, it is a
stereotype, or a characteristic, that originated and is propagated within Morocco, rather
than outside it. As such, it signifies that Moroccan society is moving past its history as a
French colonial holding and independently reclaiming its identity. It would be interesting
to see if Amazigh society within Morocco will make that move soon, or perhaps already
has. Secondly, I think about the way he presented himself to me. As an outsider, I was
more than just a customer; I represented an opportunity for that man to make a
presentation of Amazighité. Although he lives in the city, he is still connected to his
Amazigh identity, heritage, and language, and therefore, is able to portray his own
characterization of what a Moroccan Amazigh is to a larger potential audience than other
Imazighen living in the Moroccan hinterlands. He has more opportunity to encounter
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outsiders, like myself and other tourists, and experiences more friction with a largely
Arabized Morocco, which could either suppress one’s ethnic identity or bring it out in
even greater force. The Moroccan Amazigh movement is all about achieving Amazigh
parity with Arab Moroccans, and is therefore built on an acknowledgment and
reclamation of Amazigh identity. If it is going to succeed, the movement will need
popular support from average Moroccan Imazighen, like Muhammed, my friend from the
hanūt.
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